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COMMENTATIONES MATHEMATICAE UNIVERSfTATIS CAROLINAE 
26.4 (1965) 
UTILITY THEORY IN THE ALTERNATIVE SET THEORY 
K. TRUFAJOVA, P. VOPCNKA 
Abstract. Theory of utility in the alternative set theory 
enables us to comprehend more delicately a preference relation, 
especially its infinitesimal differences. We prove that there is 
a valuation for any class with a preference relation .New, non-
traditional, but natural questions arise and we solve some of 
them. 
Key words: Alternative set theory, utility theory, preferen-
ce relation, valuation. 
Classification: 03E70, 90A06, 90A12. 
Introduction. Utility theory was formulated by John von Neu-
mann and Oscar Morgenstern in 1943.In the present paper we devel-
op it from the point of view of the alternative set theory. The 
both theories are compared in § 4. We modify the approach of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in the following way. 
Let S be a class of objects. Let us imagine a man before 
whom we put various elements of this class and he chooses among 
them. When we put before him two elements of S he is able to 
choose one of the two. 
Let us extend this picture. Let him choose not only between 
objects, but also between their combinations with stated proba-
bilities. A combination of n elements u,,...,u (nfeFN) of S 
with probabilities oC-^,..., oCn ( o^e FRN, dCi Z 0, Srfj = 1) 
represents a game in which aC^ is a probability of gaining U p 
oC? is a probability of gaining u2, etc. We denote this game by 
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°^lul "*",,*+ °^nun o r • A ̂ i11!* Thus when we put before the man 
two combinations •V4oCiui' •̂ •4 $ivi' n e e i t n e r prefers 
XoOiui to "£ (J v. ( S ot>iui fr- *£ p.v.) or vice versa 
( SlAiV. -̂ SELcĈ u.̂ ) or he considers them to be indifferent 
( S o o ^ N̂/ 2E Pjvj)-
We u&e notions defined in £V]. N denotes the class of natu-
ral numbers, ZN of integers, RN of rational numbers. FN is the 
class of finite natural numbers, FRN of finite rational numbers. 
§ 1. Class S and a Preference Relation. In what follows we 
shall denote the class of objects by S. 
Definition. Let oc be an element of FRN such that 0 £ OG £ 1. 
Then we call 06 a probability coefficient. 
Definition.Let SpRN be a linear space with the basis S over 
FRN. Let us denote $[llsSpRN the class of all convex combinati-
ons of elements of S, i.e. 
SHI = ^ I flo.u.; ( V i ) d * -•-* n)(ui« S fcc^ is a probability 
coefficient & .2EL. &* = If. 
Stl] is a cla&s of games described in the introduction. We 
write X ecu. instead of .-£-. o&.u. for some n 6 FN and letters 
1 1 1»« I 1 i 
UjVjWjU, , . , . for elements of S and a,b,c,a.,.., for elements of 
SU1 in the short-hand notation. 
Definition. £- is a preference relation on S, provided 
y & 'StllxSlll and it holds: if a,b,c are elements of Sill, oC 
being a probability coefficient, then 
(PI) -l (a h a), 
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(P2) ( a ^ b g c b r - c ) =*> a >- c, 
(P3) ( i ( a h b ) g , i ( b ^ c ) ) . ^ i ( a r c ) , 
(P4) a ^ b a t o C a + ( l - c C ) c > - o t b + ( l - o c ) c . 
In what fo l lows l e t S always be a c lass of objects w i th a 
preference r e l a t i o n y -
Theorem 1 . 1 . Let a ,b , c , d be elements of S t l l , oC be a pro -
b a b i l i t y c o e f f i c i e n t . Then 
( a ^ - b & c h d ) «-t oca + (1 - oc- )c >* oc b + (1 -oC )d and 
( - i ( a > - b ) & i ( c J~d)) *-> -i (oca + (1 - oc )c y oC b + (1 - <c ) d ) . 
Remark. Assuming (P4), these two assertions are equivalent 
to (P2) and (P3). 
Definition. Let a,b be elements of SLU . a t v b (a is indif-
ferent to b) if n(af-b)fc -i(b^a). 
Theorem 1.2. An indifference relation is an equivalence. 
Proof. Reflexivity from (PI), symmetry from the Definition, 
transitivity from (P3). 
Theorem 1.3. Let us define a relation )r on Stl] / **s as 
follows: [a] >ttb] iff a y b. r is a preference relation on S/<\/ 
and it is a strict linear ordering of S/<^ • 
Proof. The definition of & is correct. This follows from 
(P2) and (P3). The assertion IE cCjJ-U^ = t 2. o O ^ ] follows 
from 1.1. Hence (S/rv) [1] = SU]/<v £ SFRN/^\/ . All axioms 
(PI) - (P4) hold. When u,v are elements of S such that Lu]-Mv] 
then either tu] ^ t v] or lv] 9 tul. 
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By 1 .3, from now on, we shall w . l . o . g . consider any prefer-
ence relation to be also a strict linear ordering of S. 
§ 2. The Definition and the Existence of a Va luat ion . One 
of our main goals is to find a valuation of S, i.e. an embedding 
of S into RN, which preserves a preference relation. In this way 
we find prices of objects of S. 
The following definition proves to be useful. 
Definition. StOl = { Z oC^u^ ( V i X u ^ s & ot̂ fe FRN) fc 
& % <*i = 0 fc *£ loC.I > OJ. 
Each element of StO] can be evidently written in this form: 
2-c-OiU. + 5T - (^v,, where the relations *Z.<£. = X (i . = 
oc. fti 
= y > 0 and SET x u, e S t i l and 2T v , c S t l l h o l d . 
f i /y l 
Definition. Let !£ot».u. + S - p ^ i be an element of St03, 
2 : 0 0 , = X (J. = T > 0 . We d e f i n e 
<*i # i 
T o^iUi + Z - P i v i > 0 i - 2 — u i *- S - 5 - v. and 
_ - u -> ] £ — -
1 . , . 
r 1 t l 
According to this definition we divided the class SCO] into 
two parts. In the first part, there are elements greater than or 
equal to zero, and in the second one, there are elements less than 
or equal to zero. 
Theorem 2 . 1 . Let a,b be elements of StOl, & being an ele-
ment of FRN. Then 
(1) (a>0fcb>0) -«-->(a + b > 0 ) , 
( a < 0 & b < 0 ) *-#(a + b < 0 ) . 
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ІECУҶUІ • Z - tVi.<o i f - - — x - . - < *•-¥ "«• 
(2) i> > 0 s-> (a>0 =.-. ^ • a > 0 ) , 
$ < 0 =* (a> 0 s ^ • a < 0 ) . 
Definition. Function F is a valuation of S if dom(F)cs, 
rng(F)£RN and if ^oO:U. is an element of S[03 then 
S«6,U> Q s 2 oOi F(ui)>0 and 
I ^ - ^ O » -toe. F(u i)«<:0. 
A valuation F of S is a total valuation if dom(F) = S. 
Theorem 2.2. Let {f ,ntfN} be a sequence of valuations^ of 
S such that ffn£ Fh+1 for all n. Then F= U4F n,n*FNi is a func-
tion and it is a valuation. 
Theorem 2.3. Let F be a valuation of S and let F be at most 
countable. Let w be an element of S which is not an element of 
dom(F). Then there is a zftRN such that F u i <w,z>f is a valu-
ation . 
Proof. Put Y = ̂ 2oC iu i; ( Vi)(ui€ dom(F) & t*.*RN)S. 
S t y l e t * = -1\. I f IE oCjU. i s an e lemen t o f ' Y then w + S L c G . u . 
is an element of S£0]. Put 
xxr^ ., = * x * R N ; x ^ : E - <*.F(U.)J, for w + XoC-u. * 0, 
** i i 
xcr^.. = 4 X C R N ; X 2 : - E : - <X;.F(U.)J, for w + -E oOtU.Z o. 
^ W : U > 1 / 1 1 1 
Evidently X^ ., are intervals on one side unbounded. The-
*<*iui 
re are at most countably many of them. 
We claim that Z = H i xroC.u., ^ O G ^ ^ Y ! is not empty. 
Classes >L. are set-theoretically def inable . Thus if Z is 
« I u i 
empty, the intersection of finitely many of these intervals is 
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empty. And by the definition of X we see that already the 
intersection of two of these intervals is empty. Say f x; x «£ SE -
- <*iF(ui)} n i x; x as 21 - f&iFCvj)} = 0. Hence w + Z ' o o ^ ^ O 
and w + £ (3^.20. By the theorem 2.1, -w - £/3ivi-<-0 and 
£ *&iui * £ t3ivi^0. Consequently 
X c £ . F ( u . ) - .S / 3 . F ( v . ) £ 0 , £ - /3iF(v.)-^5:- c»riF(ui) 
and it is a contradiction. 
Now, we take z 6. Z. The func t ion F u { < w , z > { i s the d e s i -
red f unc t ion . 
Theorem 2.4. For any S, there is a total valuation of S. 
Proof. If S is finite, we use several times the last theo-
rem. Otherwise either { un,n « FN i or i u^ , 00 6 -d? is an enumera-
tion of S depending on S being countable or uncountable. 
We choose F(u,)€RN arbitrarily. By the induction, we prolon-
gate the function by 2.2 and 2.3, 
Theorem 2.5. Let k, q be elements of RN, k be a positive 
number, F is a valuation of S iff k»F + q is a valuation of S. 
Theorem 2.6. For any class S there is a valuation G such that 
(1) rng(G)SN, 
(2) for Itt.u.tStl] holds £.oCiG(ui)«N . 
Remark. The theorem has the following economic interpreta-
tion. For any class S there exists a monetary unit so small that 
both values of elements of S and all values of their combinations 
can be expressed in this unit. 
Proof. Let F be any valuation of S. By IV3, it holds: there 
is a Y and a set d such that.F"S is similar to Y and Y £ d. As 
x & RN is the set-formula and as (V x)(x s F"S &Fin(x) «-* xSRN) 
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we see that dfcRN. As F"S is similar to Y, there is an endomorph-
ism H such that H"(F"S) = Y. 
Each element of d can be written as — where x and y are ele-
ments of N which are prime to each other. The set { y; (3 z 6 d)(z=-5)} 
is linearly ordered by < . Thus it has the greatest element m. 
If mfcN\FN, put k = m!, if mfcFN, put k = n!, where n is any ele-
ment of N\ FN. 
d 
Each element HoF (u ) of d can now be written as --r-- , where 
d «. ZN. If d contains also negative numbers, put 
d 
q = -min-jd , ir--€d$, otherwise put q = 0. 
lute define the function G as follows. Let ucS. Supposing 
d 
HoF (u ) = ----- put G(u) = du * q. 
HoF is a valuation , as H is an endomorphism and as the pro-
perty "to be a valuation" is set-theoretically definable with pa-
rameter S. G is also a valuation, as G = k« (HoF ) + q. 
It is easy to prove that XoC.G(u.)€.N for 2 oCjU. c SC1J . 
§ 3. Partial Preference Relation 
Definition. Let h be a preference relation on S. Let 
p ft h . Then F is called a partial preference relation on S. 
Let niFN. A partial preference relation of degree n is de-
fined by >~n = ^ r * < ^ * i V . i ? * 0i
vi> * SC13XSJ11; 1*111, 
l£k, P k i n j . 
The structure of S With a preference relation can be rather 
rich and complicated. A question offers: does hot a partial pre-
ference relation, say of a certain degree n, suffice for finding 
a total valuation? And if not, what is determined by a given 
partial preference relation? 
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Definition. 2:(S) = i y , y is a preference relation on sj. 
Definition. Let y be a partial preference relation on S. 
(1) Let a, b be elements of SCli. A relation of a, b is de-
temined by £ if (V>- 6 £ (S)( V £ 6 Z: (S)) 
( ( P £ > - a > i y ) «•> y r* <a,b>J = ^ r < a , b > ? ) . 
(2 ) Let a = Hot.ui + 21 - p.v.eSIO], *£ o^ = Z/3 i * 
= f > 0. The a is determined by V if the relation of 
at. P, 
2* u.,^ vi is determined by X • 
"If * Y * 
(3 ) Jr determines a preference relation if every a^SlO] is 
determined by y- . 
Example 1. Let oC be a probability coefficient. Let S = 
= $u,w,v{. Define W by: u y~ w y~ v. Obviously >•« c,oes not 
determine a relation of w and ecu + (1 - vC )v. 
Example 2. Let OG be a probability coefficient. Let 
S =-\U,v ,w,zi Oefine >~, by u X , v >-, w >-, z; 
v >-3(i - I ) u + i w and v y^ (1 - ~)u + i z and 
— u + (1 - ~)z y~. w and - v • (1 - H z >-, w for every ncFN. 
y , does not determine the relation of oC u + (1 - oC)z, 
oC v + (1 - oC )w, elements of SID, i.e. V-, does not determine 
ecu + (1 - oC )z - ocv - (1 - aeOwcSCO}. 
We have proved that for each S with a preference relation 
y there is its valuation . i.e. its embedding F into RN, such 
that <SCl], y > is isomorphic to <(F"S)ll] , >> • 
Thus M.l.o.g. we consider S to be a subclass of RN. 
D e f i n i t i o n . Let x, y be elements 0f RN 
x < y (x is less in order than y) if 
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( 1 ) 0.6 x < y 8c~ .&0, or 
(2) x < y £Q&£ -fco, or 
(3) x < 0 < y . 
x *=* y (x and y are equal in order) if -*i (x <. y) & -j (y < x). 
Remark, x i y denotes x < y v y l x 
Example 3. In the example 2, there is: 
\l) u-v < u-w, u-v < u-z, w-z < u-z, w-z < u-w; 
(2) oC u + (l-oo) z = o6v + (1-oc) w iff u-v = i-i-i-(w-z), 
oCU + (1-oC") z .>oC v + (1-oC) w iff u-v .> i-^-i(w-z). 
Lemma 3.1. Let x, y be elemen ts of RN. 
(1) x <. y implies x<y. 
(2) x £ 1 iff x€ BRN\Mon(0). 
(3) If x S l then x.y £ y. 
(4) If the both x and y are positive then x+y £ max { x,y$. 
Theorem 3.2. Let u,,...,u cS. Then I 2£ oC.u.1 *£ 
* max {lu-J ,...,lull for all - E o O ^ e SL'03 . 
Proof. By 3.1, \ T eC^l -£ "2,1*0.^1 jf max {I a^u-, I ,... 
..., toCnuntif max i\ u^ ,. . .,lunt*. 
Lemma 3.3. Let X be a countable subclass of positive ratio-
nal numbers. Then there is a positive rational number d such that 
(Vx4X)(d*x). 
Proof. If X has a minimal element m, put d=m. Otherwise, 
put H ={«** N; (-3 x* X ) < - i - - r . 6 x < ^ - ? . Evidently H is countable. 
Thus therg is a f| € N such that ( VeC c H)(o& < ft ) . Put 
"r 
Theorem 3.4. Let uf,...,uM be elements of S. Then there is 
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a dcRN such that, for all ._£ c C ^ e SLO], if 2E.0C.u-.4--Q then 
| X - ^ i u i > ^ d . 
Proof. Put X = ilXoCjU.I; oCj,..., oCncFRN, 2 oC. = 0} 
and use 3.3. 
Definition. We denote the d from 3.4 by d(u-,...,u ). 
Theorem 3.5. Let ui»--'un»
vi» -.-JV be elements of S such 
that (Vi)(l^i^n) I ui-vil < d(ux,... ,u R). Let 2: ociui be an e-
lement of SLO]. Then 
"2c»ciui>0 =•?• Zoc.v.^0 and 
-% cCiui< 0 «a^ X oCivi-<:0-
Proof. ".£ oCivi= SIociui + 2 - o c i ( v i - u i ) and 
I S «ci(vi-ui)l-«?* d(ua,. . . , u n ) ^ l ^ o C ^ l . By 3.1 we have the 
desired properties. 
Theorem 3. 6. Let V be a partial preference relation on S. 
Let T^-^^^i De an element of S103 which is not determined by 
>» . Then no element of SCO} which is a combination of n ele-
ments of t ut»'"» u n +il equals zero. 
Proof. Let 41, • •. ,n+l} = (a,,...,a J g {b] and suppose 
.2L._/&*U_ is an element of SLO]. Hence u_ = — £ - ,-2£* /3*u_ . -j,« 1 » j a * ^i [ii > * *• j a. 
Since . -E..CC.U. = oCa ua + . SIA aCa ua + cChuh = ,21A (oc_ --»» 4 i i ai ai V* a ai ai b i*% a-, 
- «C« • *ar)u_, + <-C»,uh, we have # 2 L „ o C . u . can be expressed as a 
I ' l l -w» i i i 
combination of n e l emen ts . Thus it is determined by > » , a cont-
radiction. 
Theorem 3.7. For each n there is an S = "tu.,,,.. »u n + 1^ , a 
partial preference relation of a degree n v on S and an element 
.X. oCiui of S103 which, is not determined by >~n. 
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0 = 
Proof. By induction we construct |u-»•••>un+l* ~ a , 
+ A <*&-* 
«*!.•••. *«_vi elements of FRN, ^ «c. * 0» such that ^f-jf^^^ l n+i t, » 1 i 4 
is not determined by V- and in addition 4 » >j <*Tui = °* 
For n=3 see the example 2. 
Suppose the assertion holds for n-l, *e prove for n. Let v,w 
be such that v ^ u > w and v-u, *=- d(u1,...,un), u--w «--. d<u1,... ,u R). 
We prove that >*n l* <v,w,u2,... ,un> = r^^ <Ujfu1 ,u2,.. . ,un> for 
all such v, w. Let a = (i^y + f&2w +...+ f*nun be an element of 
4v,w,u2,...,un] [01 which is a combination of n elements. Denote 
b = (^1+/32)u1
 +-.- + P nu n, c = P1(v-u1) + 62(w-u1). Thus I = b+ 
+ c. We have \c\ = I /JjCv-u-̂ ) + /-»2(w-u1)| -£ d(u p ... ,un) -=T 
d(u1,u1,... ,un)^lbL By 3 .5, we have a ^ 0 » - ^ b > 0 , a«:0 =.> b ^Q. 
Never a = 0. Indeed if a = 0 then either 0+=b = -c, a contradicti-
on with 1c I i. \ b\ or 0 = b = c, a contradiction with the induction 
premise, by 3.6. 
Let y be a probability coefficient. Put d = ^-(v-v + 
+ (1 -0f)w) + tSL cCjU.. For example, let oC.>0. Since 
¥ \m% X 1 r 1 
trst 
• J^2*C'lUi = ""«
ciui» we nave d > 0 if* 7" v + (1 -y)w>u 1 and 
d < 0 iff f\i + (1 -3^)w<u1. Thus d is not determined by y . 
We take v, w such that d=0. Then S = f v,*,u2,... ,u }, d€ S£0j 
have all desired properties. 
Corollary 3.8. There is no n such that every partial prefe-
rence relation of a degree n determines a preference relation. 
§ 4. A comparison of the Theory of Utility in the Cantor 
Set Theory and in the Alternative Set Theory 
The classical theory of utility differs from ours in the fol-
lowing three points. SeetF3. 
(1) A preference relation is not given on the whole Sill but 
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only on i t s subclass on Su-i<w,ccu + ( l - o c ) v > ; u ,w,veS, uy* y 
>- v, cO e Ep 0 £cc £ l}. I . e . only >-, is given. 
(2) So cal led Archimedean axiom is assumed: 
(Vu,w,v^S ) (u>-w>-v ) (3oC « E i ^ w = <*u + (1 - o O v ) . 
(3) A total valuation exists iff S contains a countable den-
se , 
Commentary. 
ad (1). Assuming (2), Y•* determines a preference r e l a t i o n . 
Indeed, if Z o C ^ c SCO}, u ^ . . . hun, then (\/i)(3/Ji«E1) 
(ut = fiiu1 + (1-/ii)un> Thus Z oCiui = SlQCi/3i(u1- u n)>0 
iff 21<ci/3i>0. Hence (1) is sufficient. 
ad (2). Von Neumann and Morgenstern wrote about the Archime-
dean axiom: It is probably desirable to require it, since its 
abandonment would be tantamount to introducing infinity utility 
differences tNMl. Infinity differences are one of the basic noti-
on s in the alternative set theory. 
In some situation the Archimedean axiom seems to be restric-
tive . Let us return to the Introduction to the man who chooses 
between elements of SU2. Let S contain a TV(t), a similar TV with 
a small hash (h), a pencil (p). Let us imagine the man prefers t 
to h and h to p. Me can also imagine he prefers h to a game in 
which he gains either t or p, though the probability of gaining 
only p would be the smallest possible. I.e. if oc is a probabili-
ty coefficient ( o £ . 4 t 0 , l ) then 
t>*h hoot • (l-oC)p^p. 
By this way we can describe incomparability of some values. 
Here t - h < t - p. 
ad (3). In the alternative set theory there is a total valu-
ation for any S. 
There is another point very important for our conception. Probabi-
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lities which appear in our games are finite rational numbers. This 
means that '"the smallest possible" stands for very small but per­
ceptible, before the horizon of our discernibility. Also elements 
of Stll represent games for n elements of S, where n is a finite 
natural number, i.e.easy to survey, before the horizon. 
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